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Industrial Illegitimacy and Negative Externalities: the Case of the Illinois Livestock 
Industry 
Abstract
An industry’s legitimacy depends on stakeholders’ perceptions and assessments of the 
appropriateness of its behavior across a wide array of settings.  While products and 
services may be highly valued, and in some cases essential, business externalities serve as 
a powerful counterforce undermining legitimacy.  The work draws on the theory of 
industrial legitimacy and employs a taxonomy of four different legitimacy sub 
components; pragmatic, regulative, normative, and cognitive.   The paper identifies how 
externalities affect an industry’s legitimacy and the relative contribution of each sub 
component.  The research then empirically tests the theory using the case of the Illinois
livestock industry.
Keywords: legitimacy, negative externalities, stakeholders, livestock, CAFO 
Introduction
A crucial dilemma faces the modern U.S. livestock industry.  Its final output (meat) is 
widely  demanded  (increasing  4.4%/year  (FAO,  2005)  and  recognized  by  many  as 
legitimate.  The production of livestock though faces increasing opposition from local 
communities about siting or expanding new facilities. While animal agriculture used to 
be  a  taken-for-granted  feature  of  rural  life,  the  negative  externalities  associated  with 
CAFOs
1 are directly and indirectly causing affected stakeholders to question whether this 
business form is appropriate or not (Martin, 2004; Wagner and Dempsey, 2003).
The challenge arises from the globalization of the livestock and meat complex.  Over the 
last 15 years the U.S. livestock industry has faced increasing competition.  In order to 
reduce  costs  of  production,  provide  more  consistent  quality,  and  provide  the  service 
                                                
1 Confined Animal Feeding Operation3
levels  end-users  demand,  farms  have  had  to  dramatically  scale  up.    As  a  result  the 
number  of  farms  has  dropped  as  the  number  of  animals  per  farms  has  increased 
dramatically  (Goldsmith  and  Hedris,  2001).  Greater  efficiency  has  caused  increased 
competitiveness,  increased  exports,  but  at  the  same  time  the  new  business  model  of 
confined animal feed operations (CAFO) has raised new challenges.  The U.S. livestock 
and meat complex now faces a similar dilemma to other industries whose products are in 
great  demand  but  the  legitimacy  of  the  siting  and  operation  of  production  plants  is 
questioned, e.g., power and chemical (see Buescher, 2004; Martin, 2001; Paterik, 2004; 
Romero, 2004).
This paper applies the theory of industrial legitimacy to better understand the threats 
challenging  the  future  of  the  U.S.  livestock  industry.  The  decline  in  the  future  of 
livestock  in  the  U.S.  may  be  as  much  about  its  inability  to  address  its  declining 
legitimacy as it is about its inability to compete in a global environment. 
The objectives of the paper are fourfold:  first to present the theory of industrial 
legitimacy; second to synthesize the theory into a useful framework for empirical 
analysis; third to provide an empirical analysis of the theory; and finally to use the 
concept of industrial legitimacy to offer prescription for the strategic direction of the U.S. 
livestock industry.
Theory
The theory of legitimacy has a long history of scholarship applied in a political context. 
Only  recently  though  has  the  legitimacy  concept  been  applied  within  the  context  of 4
organizations (Zelditch, 2001). Within this new context, “an organization is said to be 
legitimate to the extent that its means and ends appear to conform to social norms, values, 
and expectations” (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990).  Legitimacy is a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions (Suchman, 1995). 
An organization’s activities, social perceptions of adequateness, and the prevailing norms, 
combine as the driving forces behind organizational legitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; 
Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Zelditch, 2001; Zimmerman and 
Zeitz, 2002).
The perceptions held by a society are central to the concept of legitimacy.  However, 
there are different reasons why an organization’s behavior may be perceived as 
appropriate or adequate. To parsimoniously structure our empirical analysis we focus on 
four components of industrial legitimacy.  (1) An organization’s behavior can be 
considered as adequate based solely on the self interest of a specific audience, pragmatic 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995).  (2) It may also be considered adequate based on a wider 
normative system of values, where a specific action is considered to be the “right thing to 
do,” normative legitimacy (Scott, 2001; Suchman, 1995).  (3) Moreover, the perception 
of appropriateness with respect to an organization’s form and behavior can be derived 
from its acceptance “as a taken-for-granted feature of the environment,” cognitive 
legitimacy (Aldrich, 1999) or, (4) more objectively, can be derived from the organization 
compliance with current laws and government regulations, regulative legitimacy (Aldrich, 
1999; Scott, 2001).  5
Pragmatic Legitimacy 
Pragmatic legitimacy is based on individual interests, resting on the “self-interested 
calculation of an organization’s most immediate audiences” (Suchman, 1995).  Self-
interest may be a function of convenience (or lack thereof) or from an economic 
perspective, on the benefits and costs stakeholders receive with respect to the activities of 
the organization.  In this type of legitimacy, there is a direct relationship between the 
audience being affected – either positively or negatively – and the legitimacy they confer.  
The greater are the benefits and the utility provided by an organization to an audience, the 
higher is the pragmatic legitimacy this audience confers.  The utility provided to the 
consumers by an industry’s final products, the revenues generated to the suppliers, and 
the financial returns to shareholders are all sources of pragmatic legitimacy.  On the other 
hand, the negative impacts
2 from business externalities imposed by an organization on 
other stakeholders are sources of pragmatic illegitimacy.  For example, a firm’s 
contamination of a community’s water supply would contribute to the deterioration of a 
firm’s pragmatic legitimacy as measured by increased liability (direct effects) and a 
falling stock price (indirect effects) (Bansal and Clelland, 2004). 
Regulative Legitimacy
Regulative legitimacy has  it  basis in  compliance with  the law, regulations,  and rules 
(Scott, 2001).  It stems from the generalized perception of an organization complying 
                                                
2 Economic “bads” as opposed to economic “goods”6
with the relevant laws and regulations, as well as from the perception of its adherence to 
relevant  standards  and  norms  of  professional  bodies  and  credentialing  associations 
(Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002).  Within an industry, a firm perceived to address all the 
regulations  and  the  requirements  pertaining  to  its  operation  attains  relatively  greater 
regulative legitimacy compared with its peers.  
The  integration  of  the  law,  regulations,  and  rules,  and  an  industry’s  corresponding 
compliance  provide  formalized  and  objective  evaluation  parameters  for  regulative 
legitimacy.  Having a more objective or arm’s length metric makes regulative legitimacy 
distinct  when  compared  to  the  other  (three) sources  of  legitimacy.    The  objective 
reference points allow an organization to claim legitimacy based on its conformity to 
current regulation or to demonstrate conformity through media communication and state 
agency  tacit  endorsement  (Zimmerman  and  Zeitz,  2002).    However,  the  laws  and 
regulations may not have straightforward prescriptions for conduct even though objective 
assessment  is  possible  (Suchman  and  Edelman,  1997).    Moreover,  the  difficulty  in 
monitoring and evaluating organizations’ performance vis-à-vis the law or regulations
poses an obstacle for claiming or confirming the achievement of conformity.  
In addition to the level of conformity itself, it is also important how an organization 
behaves with respect to laws and regulations.  Regulative legitimacy also “involves a 
generalized sense that the new venture is operating according to the letter and the spirit of 
laws and regulations” (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002).  Important is not being perceived to 
be reactive and resistant towards prevailing legal or regulatory requirements.  In this 7
sense, two firms with similar conformity profiles and different attitudes with respect to 
regulations may have different levels of regulative legitimacy.
Regulative  legitimacy  is  conferred  differently  by  different  stakeholders.    This  is 
particularly important with respect to hazardous or noxious industries that are heavily 
regulated.  Government and state agencies, besides setting the laws and the regulations, 
are also primarily responsible for sanctioning and enforcement. Government beliefs and 
perceptions with respect to regulative legitimacy become crucial to the overall legitimacy 
of an industry.  Aldrich (1999) proposes a two-fold typology: cognitive and sociopolitical 
legitimacy, the last one being divided into two components: the moral acceptance and the 
regulative  acceptance.  The  regulative  acceptance  refers  specifically  to  governmental 
acceptance and its symbolic effect.  Government’s approval is critical for the survival and 
development of an industry through the symbolism of acceptance or official recognition
of its presence (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Aldrich, 1999; Aldrich and Baker, 2001).   
One reason conveying legitimacy by the government can be so critical is that there are 
many times significant risks and uncertainties associated with new products or processes.  
This made lead to heightened public scrutiny or even being ruled illegal.  So government 
support of a new business or activity can help assuage concerns.  Similarly, an industry’s 
legitimacy  state  may  affect  the  degree  of  governmental  activism  associated  with 
sanctions being enforced, taxes levied, or subsidies provided.  This in turn can have direct 
impacts on an industry’s evolution. Governmental approval also has symbolic meaning in 8
the form of signaling
3 to different stakeholders as to the legitimacy of an industry.  For 
example,  the  three-year  moratorium  on  new  taxes  determined  by  the  Internet  Tax 
Freedom  Act,  which  became  law  in  October  1998,  signaled  the  federal  government 
recognition’s  that  the  development  of  internet  commerce  was  proper  and  legitimate 
(Wald, 1998; Aldrich and Baker, 2001). This ruling then had tremendous impact on how 
internet commerce evolved.  
Government recognition is a critical issue for the case of the Illinois livestock industry 
discussed below.  The siting process was specifically designed under the assumption that 
the Department of Agriculture is the legitimizer.  The empirical analysis offers insight as 
to the limits and complexities of the government, or a specific agency, serving as “the”
legitimizing  institution.    The  legitimization  by  government  or  a  specific  government 
agency is an especially important issue to understand when there exists other stakeholder 
agencies or that might serve as; a more honest trust broker, or as a counter force de-
legtimizing  an  activity,  or  finally  as  a  complementary  agency  that  enhances  the 
legitimizing  process.    Examples  of  the  three  types  or  agencies  within  the  livestock 
context could be; EPA as an honest broker; Department of Natural Resources as the 
counter force; and Economic Development as a complementary force.  
Normative Legitimacy
                                                
3 Legitimacy statements emitted by various government agencies, (i.e. agriculture), may be interpreted 
differently by the various stakeholder groups (i.e. environmental).  9
Normative legitimacy has its base in societal norms and values. These norms and values 
serve as a reference for the perceptions of what is considered appropriate or adequate.  
Values  indicate  what  is  preferred or  desirable,  and  provide  a  standard  against  which 
behaviors can be compared.  The norms specify “how things should be done” (Scott, 
2001).  The closer an organization’s goals and means align with the norms and values of 
the relevant stakeholders, the higher is the normative legitimacy. 
The  normative  dimension  of  legitimacy  introduces  a  prescriptive,  evaluative  and 
obligatory dimension into social life (Weber, 1968).  The shared understandings of what 
is considered to be right and of what is considered to be wrong create expectations about 
behavior.  This  differs  from pragmatic legitimacy in  which morality does  not  play  a 
central role in judgments of appropriateness.  
Norms and values provide a basis for normative legitimacy and range from those that are 
more general and applicable to all organizations within the business environment - such 
as fair play and fair treatment of employees and customers - to those that are specific to 
an industry (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Specific norms and value expectations may 
vary from industry to industry.  
Professional  associations  serve  as  a  powerful  force  within  each  industry  explicitly 
determining appropriate norms and values specific to an industry (Ruef and Scott, 1998; 
Scott et al, 2000; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). These professional associations not only 
establish norms and reflect changes over time, but may also serve as a legitimating body.  10
Organizations that receive positive evaluations from one association are likely to display 
them publicly.  While a negative evaluation not only would reflect an internal a loss of 
normative legitimacy, but when communicated through the media may signal a loss of 
normative  legitimacy  to  outsiders.    For  example,  the  American  Medical  Association 
(AMA) and the American Hospital Association (AHA) has long had strong influence in 
the U.S. healthcare field, establishing tight professional norms that enhance public trust 
(Ruef and Scott, 1998).
Cognitive Legitimacy 
Cognitive legitimacy is based on the assumption or belief that one form of organizational
behavior  may  be  the  single  appropriate  entity  to  produce  the  product  or  service. 
Normative  legitimacy has  a  moral  frame  of  reference  as  the  basis  for  evaluating
institutions  and  organizations.    Cognitive  legitimacy results  from taken-for  granted 
scripts, rules, routines, and classification that are adopted by individuals as they frame or 
define a situation (DiMaggio and Powell,1991; Scott, 2001).  The concept’s underlying 
theory is rooted in cognitive models of psychology in which schemas and scripts lead 
decision  makers  to  resist  new  evidence  (Abelson,  1976;  Cantor  and  Mischel,  1977), 
learning theories that emphasize how individuals organize information with the assistance 
of  social  categories  (Rosch  et  al.,  1976;  Rosch,  1978);  and  attribution  theory,  where 
actors infer motives post hoc from menus of legitimate accounts (Bem, 1970; Kelley, 
1971; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).11
The distinctive feature of cognitive legitimacy is its “taken-for-granted” characteristic 
(Aldrich, 1999; Scott, 2001; Suchman, 1995; Zeitz and Zimmerman, 2002).  Even though 
stakeholders  can  confer  legitimacy  by  normatively  evaluating  the  organization  goal, 
output  or  process,  they  can  also  take  it  for  granted  as  a  feature  of  the  environment 
(Jepperson, 1991). Therefore, an organization is legitimate from the cognitive perspective 
when there is little question in individual’s mind, for example, whether the good is to be 
produced (e.g., primary education) or how it is to be produced (e.g., public schools).  
Connoting cognitive legitimacy affirms that the organization’s output and the process 
adopted in production are the natural way to do it (Hannan and Carroll, 1992).  Not only 
can  specific  products  and  processes  achieve  taken  for  granted  status,  but  also  an 
organization’s general goals and motivations can achieve similar status.  For example, in 
capitalist economies, profit seeking activities enjoy a general belief of being valid and 
individuals take it for granted as a common goal within the market place (Delacroix et al., 
1989).
Methodology
There’s  little  empirical  understanding  about  how  the  four  sources  of  legitimacy  are 
interrelated  and  about  the  importance  of  each  form  within  the  same  context  of  an 
industry’s  legitimacy.  Only  recently  has  legitimacy  theory  been  applied  within  the 
context  of  modern  organizations  (Zelditch,  2001).    looked  spectifically  eparately  at 
regulative  and  normative  legitimacy.    Elsbach  (1994)  and  Ruef  and  Scott  (1998) 
specifically  focused  on  normative  legitimacy,  while  Deephouse  (1996)  specifically 
looked at regulative legitimacy.  Authors also have employed a non specific definition of 12
legitimacy; as the endorsement and/or support by society (see Elsbach and Sutton, 1992; 
Bansal and Clelland, 2004).  However, the employment of such a broad definition or 
focusing at only one dimension may ignore other legitimacy forces at play. A narrow 
focus  on  one  form  of  legitimacy,  or  a  broad  focus  that  utilizes  a  general  definition, 
provides  little  room  for  investigating  the  nuances  or  interaction  of  the  different 
components of legitimacy. Thus our contribution is to analyze four central concepts of 
legitimacy from within one dataset to better see their interplay in the overall legitimacy 
state of the industry.
There are significant methodological challenges when empirically studying legitimacy. 
There are the practical problems of assessing stakeholders’ subjective perceptions and 
beliefs as they grant or withdraw legitimacy with respect to an organization.  Indirect 
methods, such as newspaper content analysis or event studies have been used to assess 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the legitimate state of an organization (Elsbach and Sutton, 
1992; Deephouse, 1996; Bansal and Clelland, 2004).  Even though indirect methods do 
provide  a  proxy  for  the  constituencies’  perceptions  as  to  the  legitimacy  state  of  an 
organization, it is not possible to control for bias like the framing of the media (Elsbach, 
1994).    Or,  in  the  case  of  population  density  measurements  it  can  be  difficult  to 
understand  the  role  and  the  judgment  of  different  stakeholders (Hannan  and  Carroll, 
1992).
This  empirical  approach  paper utilizes  the  inductive  method  and  follows  a  grounded 
approach  (Glaser  and  Strauss,  1967;  Eisenhardt,  1989;  Strauss  and  Corbin;  1998).  13
Inductive analysis is employed because of: the newness of the theoretical application to 
organizations;  the  lack  of  theoretical  work  on  the  four  legitimacy  types  and  their 
interrelationship;  and  the  limited  number  of  empirical studies  assessing  an  industry’s 
legitimacy state.  
Data Sources
The  Livestock  Management  Facility  Act  (LMFA)  in  Illinois  provides  a  unique 
opportunity for the study of the State’s livestock industry’s legitimacy.  The Act, which 
was  adopted  in  1996  and  amended  in  1998  and  1999,  primarily  focused  on  setting 
standards for the operation and the siting of livestock facilities. Requirements are more or 
less stringent depending on the size of the proposed facility. There are specified setbacks 
from an occupied residence and populated areas, specific standards for lagoon design, 
certification  requirements  for  the  livestock  manager  and  the  need  for  a  waste 
management  plan.  The  requirements  are  summarized  in  eight  sitting  criteria  (see 
Appendix A). 
Relevant to the subject of this research is the Act’s requirement that the local community 
has the right to a formal public informational meeting in the county where the siting is to 
occur. More specifically, if the proposed facility will house 1,000 or more animal units or 
use an earthen lagoon then the county board may call for a public hearing, which is 
administered for all counties by the Illinois Department of Agriculture (IDA). The public 
hearing process utilizes a professional IDA facilitator, a set of IDA resource people. and 
follows a set meeting design.  The IDA representative first explains the purpose and 
terms of the Act (LMFA).  This is then a formal presentation is made by the proponent 14
firm (farm) and its associated experts.  Finally there are audience’s question and open 
testimonials by the audience. All statements made during the hearing are captured by a 
government appointed stenographer, compiled into official hearing transcripts, and made 
available to the public through the Freedom of Information Act. 
The first public meeting took place in 1999 and since then there were 21 hearings held at 
the request of a local county board.  Each hearing lasted on average three hours and 
involved  30  stakeholders  and  shareholders.  The  cross  section  reflects  19
4 different
farmers, in 17 different counties. 
Data Analysis
The data analysis followed the grounded analysis approach of Strauss and Corbin (1998).
The initial step involved a broad scan of the transcripts isolating all text units that dealt 
with any aspect of the appropriateness as an activity of livestock production in general or 
the facility in particular.  
(Unfortunately  circumstances  did  not  allow  us  to  complete  our  analysis.  We 
apologize.  The following material focused on one of the 21 transcripts and was 
presented earlier at the annual meeting of the International Food and Agribusiness 
Management  Association  in  Chicago  in  2005.    An  updated  manuscript  will  be 
available  at  the  2006  annual  meeting  of  the  American  Agricultural  Economics 
Association in Long Beach California.)
                                                
4 Two farmers submitted two different applications involving the same facility.15
Results: Dairy #1
The public informational meeting to be analyzed is for a proposed dairy farm and will be 
called D1 (Dairy #1).  It is to be sited in Illinois, in a county where there are currently no 
dairy cows, but where agriculture is the number one industry.  The closest town is 1.6 
miles away from the site and has a population of less than 1,000 people.  The proposed 
facility is designed for 6,102 animal units (4,358 dairy cows) and would be the largest 
dairy farm in the State.  The public informational meeting was held in November, 2000.  
It began at 6:00 p.m. and ended at 11:25 p.m. 
 There were 48 persons who spoke during the D1 hearing, producing 55 text units (Table 
1a).    WT  are  the  written  testimonies,  Reg  are  comments  made  by  the  government 
regulators  (Illinois  Department  of  Agriculture),  Q  Reg  are  the  questions  back  to  the 
regulators, Firm is the farmer and the expert team, Q Firm are public questions to the firm, 
and Test are the public testimonials.  Most comments (45%) were made during the public 
question period, either in the form of questions or through testimonials.  The government 
representatives by design speak very little and are to serve more of a resource role for 
questioners.    Interestingly  though  their  comments  and  associated  public  questions 
accounted for 20% of the text units.  
Table 1a: Text Unit by Public Meeting Sections
WT Reg Q  Reg Firm Q Firm Test Total
Text Units 6 1 11 3 9 25 55
Text Units% 11% 2% 20% 5% 16% 45% -
Text Units 6 12 12 25 55
Text units% 11% 22% 22% 45% -
WT Reg. Firm Test Total16
Table 1b: Word Count by Public Meeting Sections
WT Reg. Q  Reg. Firm Q Firm Test. Total
WC Average 215 1,257 383 2,734 529 772 -
WC Total 1,293 1,257 4,213 8,202 4,761 19,300 39,026
WC Total % 3% 3% 11% 21% 12% 50% -
WC Total 1,293 5,470 12,963 19,300 39,026
WC Total % 3% 14% 33% 50% -
WT Reg. Firm Test Total
Using word counts as an activity metric, 50% of the words were expressed during the 
open question session of the hearing.  The firm’s opening presentation was considerable 
comprising 21% of the words.  Follow up questions to both the firm and the government 
comprised 23% of the total words spoken.  In this particular case, the submitted written 
testimonials were brief and contributed little insight into the legitimacy issue or those 
who choose to submit written testimonials.
The legitimacy forms – pragmatic, regulative, normative and cognitive – were scored 
across  the  text  units  in  two  ways:  (1)  “Predominant  Legitimacy”  is  the  variable 
representing the type of legitimacy that is predominant in one particular text unit and (2) 
“Legitimacy Types” is the variable representing all the legitimacy types that came up 
within  one  text  unit.  For  example,  if  the  entire  transcript  was  only  one  text  unit, 
“Predominant Legitimacy” could only be pragmatic, regulative, normative or cognitive, 
while “Legitimacy Types” could be either, one, two, three, or all of the four types. 
Pragmatic legitimacy was the dominant form, being found in 85% of the text units and 
being the predominant form of legitimacy 65% of the time (Table 2). The high frequency 
and predominance of the pragmatic form of legitimacy may be due to the nature of this 17
hearing that particularly involved neighborhood issues.  This may or may not be the case 
across the set of transcript hearings.  65% of the stakeholders were local and may have 
had direct interaction with the site or the business, thus raising a number of pragmatic 
issues (Figure 1).  
The pragmatic nature of the relationships may be in the form of direct business relations 
as a supplier to the business and thus be a positive form of legitimacy.  68% (17/25) of 
the  testimonials  were  positive  statements.    Or  the  neighborhood  issues  may  take  a 
negative  form  and  be  due  to  cost  or  risk  bearing  from  the  farms,  real  or  perceived, 
negative amenities.  Over half (9/14) of the negative comments came in the form of oral 
or written testimonials.  Another reason for the dominance of pragmatic legitimacy may 
be that pragmatic arguments may be normatively preferred when stakeholders attempt to 
sway public opinion.  This would have the effect of introducing empirical bias into the 
analysis.  This form of bias will be analyzed across the set of transcripts. 
Table 2: Frequency of Legitimacy – Predominant and Types Used
Pragmatic Regulative Normative Cognitive
Predominant Leg (%) 65% 23% 6% 6%
(Count) 34 12 3 3
Leg Types Used(%) 85% 46% 33% 25%
(Count) 44 24 17 13
Table 3: Hearing Distribution by Position and Section
WT Reg. Q  Reg. Firm Q Firm Test. Total
In favor 1 - - 3 - 17 21
Neutral 1 1 9 - 6 1 18
Against 2 - 2 - 3 7 14
Total 4 1 11 3 9 25 5318
With respect to the other forms of legitimacy, regulative-based statements are mentioned 
at almost half of the transcript text units. And despite the fact that the normative or the 
cognitive dimensions are rarely used as the predominant form within a statement, they 
came up at least 25% of the time across the text units. The different forms of legitimacy 
are not only used by different people, but of the four possible types, almost two – 1.88
5 -
are used in average at any text unit statement. 
Another important dimension in the assessment of legitimacy is understanding who are 
the stakeholders that grant or with legitimacy (Wood, 1991).  Of the 48 participants in the 
hearing, 65% of the identified text units are either from local residents within a 15 miles 
radius of the proposed site or from the county (Figure 1). 












Local (65%) Non Local (10%) Non Identified (25%)
Stakeholder's origin
Pragmatic legitimacy issues dominated the hearing, in part, because they overwhelmingly 
dominated the oral testimonies  focused especially on the pragmatic legitimacy of the 
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number of text unit where a legitimacy form could be identified (52).19
proposed  facility  (Tables  4A).  Interspersed  within  those  pragmatic  concerns  were 
normative and cognitive statements about the legitimacy of the firm (Table 4b).  The 
regulators, not surprisingly dealt more with the regulative legitimacy of the proposal.   
Thus  their  role  is  narrowly  specified  and  carried  out  such  that  they  do  serve  as  a 
normative institution in the way that an advocacy group might. The firm in its message 
not only addressed its compliance with the LMFA, signifying its regulative legitimacy, 
but drew on normative issues to justify its existence.
Table 4a:  Predominant Legitimacy by Public Meeting Section
WT Reg. Q Reg. Firm Q Firm Test
Pragmatic 67% 0% 36% 0% 78% 84%
Regulative 33% 100% 55% 67% 0% 8%
Normative 0% 0% 0% 33% 11% 4%
Cognitive 0% 0% 9% 0% 11% 4%
Table 4b: Legitimacy Types Used by Public Meeting Section
WT Reg. Q Reg. Firm Q Firm Test
Pragmatic 67% 0% 64% 100% 89% 96%
Regulative 33% 100% 91% 100% 11% 32%
Normative 0% 100% 9% 100% 22% 40%
Cognitive 0% 0% 9% 33% 22% 36%
At  the  Firm  section,  a  curious  mismatch  can  be  observed:  while  the  firm  was 
predominantly regulative in its presentation, the questions posed by the public to the firm 
were pragmatic. This difference in the legitimacy frame between the firm and the public 
may suggest a mismatch between what the firm thinks it should address and what at-risk 
stakeholders expects the firm to address. 
One  important  practical  question  is  whether  the  LMFA  is  sufficient  as  a  process  to 
legitimize the siting of a CAFO.  This one case shows a mismatch, whereby the concerns 
are very pragmatic, but the Firm and the Regulators draw on regulative or normative 20
justifications.  Thus there may be a gap between the legal/regulatory standard and the 
community standard.  There may be risks that the local community feels it bears that are 
unaddressed by the LMFA process.  This gap may need to be formally addressed because 
individuals and communities now have found they have standing through the civil court 
system to address these extra-regulative risks.  
Conclusion
Because the research is still in process conclusions are preliminary at best.  We have 
looked at one of the cases to get a initial feel for what the transcripts and the analytical 
model have to offer.  The initial findings were very encouraging.  It is expected that the 
population  of  transcripts  will  yield  significant  insights  into  the  nature  of  legitimacy 
theory as well as the CAFO problem.  The empirical work will utilize a formal analytical 
model  involving  outside  trained  scorers  that  will  lend  a  level  of  objectivity  and 
repeatability  to  the  research.      Under  such  conditions  the  complementary  statistical 
analyses will yield powerful insights.  
An industry can be perceived as legitimate based on the stakeholders’ self-interest 
(1), on its compliance with regulations (2), on its consonance with society values (3),  and 
its  alignment  with  more  deeply  taken  for  granted  beliefs  and  assumptions (4).    The 
research will result in: an assessment of the level of legitimacy of the Illinois livestock 
industry using the four identified theoretical reference categories; an understanding of the 
interrelatedness of the four categories and their relationship to firm externalities; and 21
more broadly applicable empirical evidence about the various sources of legitimacy and 
their relative impacts and contributions to an overall legitimacy state.
Implications 
The application of knowing, taxonomically, where legitimacy is being derived or 
withheld will allow the livestock industry to more completely understand the opposition 
they face and then go about designing more effective response strategies and tactics.  For 
example, industry may be perplexed why opposition is unrelenting and overall legitimacy 
is being withheld even though legal compliance and regulative legitimacy have been 
achieved.  Livestock’s legitimacy though may be rooted in other areas, many having to 
do with the risk bearing of externalities by the community.  A gap may exist between the 
community and legal standards.  A firm overly focused on the regulatory obligations may 
leave other critical issues unattended.  A risk premium on capital costs may result due to 
the existence of the community standards gap, making a project infeasible.  1
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Appendix A: Eight LMFA criteria (verbatim), Illinois Department of Agriculture
1. Whether registration and livestock waste management plan certification 
requirements, if required, are met by the notice of intent to construct. 
2. Whether the design, location, or proposed operation will protect the environment 
by being consistent with this Act. 
3. Whether the location minimizes any incompatibility with the surrounding area’s 
character by being located in any area zoned for agriculture where the county has 
zoning or where the county is not zoned, the setback requirements established by 
this Act are complied with. 
4. Whether the facility is located within a 100-year floodplain or an otherwise 
environmentally sensitive area (defined as an area of karst area or with aquifer 
material within 5 feet of the bottom of the livestock waste handling facility) and 
whether construction standards set forth in the notice of intent to construct are 
consistent with the goal of protecting the safety of the area. 
5. Whether the owner or operator has submitted plans for operation that minimize 
the likelihood of any environmental damage to the surrounding area from spills, 
runoff, and leaching. 
6. Whether odor control plans are reasonable and incorporate reasonable or 
innovative odor reduction technologies given the current state of such 
technologies. 
7. Whether traffic patterns minimize the effect on existing traffic flows. 
8. Whether construction or modification of a new facility is consistent with existing 
community growth, tourism, recreation, or economic development or with 
specific projects involving community growth, tourism, recreation, or economic 
development that have been identified by government action for development or 
operation within one year through compliance with applicable zoning and setback 
requirements for populated areas established by this Act. 